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engineering passes a cost-benefit test. The cost of postponing climate engineering by 20-30 
years is relatively low.  Going beyond these standard cost-benefit analyses, climate 
engineering may still fail; voters may dislike the idea of climate engineering; they do not like 
the idea of  tampering with nature, and their dislike stands  independent of outcomes of cost-
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Climate Engineering: 
Cost benefit and beyond 
 
Abstract 
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emissions, have thus far proved unsuccessful. This motivates exploration of other strategies 
such as climate engineering. We modify the Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the 
Economy (DICE), and use it in a cost-benefit analysis of climate engineering specifically 
deposition of sulphur in the stratosphere. The model simulations show that climate 
engineering passes a cost-benefit test. The cost of postponing climate engineering by 20-30 
years is relatively low.  Going beyond these standard cost-benefit analyses, climate 
engineering may still fail; voters may dislike the idea of climate engineering; they do not like 
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1 Reconsidering climate change governance  
International governance for climate change has so far not been a success. Most of the world’s 
countries have participated in the United Nations’ Framework Convention Climate Change 
Convention since 1992. The goal of the climate change convention is to stabilize the amount 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to avoid dangerous man-made climate change. Almost 
twenty years after the founding of the climate change convention, and after 15 Conferences of 
the Parties, including Kyoto 1997 and Copenhagen 2009, the overall concentration of 
greenhouse gases has increased. The concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide increased 
by 5% during the 1995–2005 period, the highest measured decadal increase since recordings 
began in the 1950s (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, p 2). 
 
Lack of success in stabilizing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere motivates the exploration 
of other strategies and approaches to abate climate change. One of these strategies is to 
engineer a radiation balance in the atmosphere. Pumping sulfur aerosols into the sky reduces 
the amount of solar radiation entering lower parts of the atmosphere, thus reducing global 
temperatures. In 1991, Mount Pinatubo, a volcano located in the Philippines, erupted, 
releasing large amounts of sulfur, thus creating a natural experiment in climate engineering. 
The eruption led to a global cooling of 0.5 °C the following year (Hansen et al., 1992). 
 
Climate engineering is more likely to implement than emission reduction; the direct cost of 
climate engineering is relatively low, and a small coalition of countries may partake in it, 
(Barrett, 2008). These characteristics overcome consensus rules that govern the UN’s Climate 
Change Convention. Within the UN, a handful of countries can block proposals.  Proposals 
agreed upon may be so because they are part of “business as usual.” Because climate 
engineering seems technical and economically feasible, it is more likely to be undertaken. 
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Another advantage of climate engineering is that it may be put into effect quickly, promoting 
its use as an emergency tool in the case of rapid climate change.  
 
However, climate engineering may have serious negative consequences. Important 
environmental risks are drought in Africa and Asia, ozone depletion, very rapid global 
warming if climate engineering is interrupted, and whitening of the sky (Robock et al., 2009). 
Although it is possible to foresee some environmental consequences, it will still be impossible 
to anticipate all the consequences of climate engineering, making it a project of uncertainty.  
 
In this paper, we present a cost-benefit analysis of climate engineering. We add climate 
engineering as a policy variable in the Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the 
Economy (DICE); developed by William Nordhaus and his coworkers.1 The optimal mix of 
policy instruments realizes by equalizing the marginal benefits and costs of mitigation, 
adaptation and climate engineering.   
 
Furthermore, we go beyond the standard cost-benefit analyses and discuss climate 
engineering in a public choice perspective. Even though climate engineering passes a standard 
cost-benefit test, it may fail as a policy in practice. As there is skepticism towards climate 
engineering in the scientific community, this may also be true in the public. Voters may 
dislike the idea climate engineering, independent of the outcome of cost-benefit analyses. 
Therefore, politicians may find it difficult to advocate climate engineering.    
 
 
                                                 
1 DICE is an integrated dynamic model, combining an economic growth model rooted in the work of Ramsey 
(1928) with a global climate model.  Nordhaus (1994) developed the original DICE, with further contributions 
by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). We use the version documented by Nordhaus (2007), delta version 8, 
downloaded 03.12.2009. 
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2 Climate engineering  
We define climate engineering as deliberately changing the radiation balance in the 
atmosphere.   The radiation balance is constant if the amount of energy absorbed as sunlight 
equals the amount emitted back as long-wave radiation. The current net balance of about 240 
W/m2 predicts a temperature of -19 C, which equals the observed temperature at 5 km 
altitude (Le Treut  et al., 2007, p 97).   The temperature on Earth is higher, and one reason for 
this is the presence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. These gases absorb sunlight, thus 
causing temperature increases. Climate engineering reduces radiation absorbed in the 
atmosphere by reflecting more of it back into space. An additional reflection of 4 W/m2 
balances the heating caused by doubling of CO2 concentrations (Blackstock et al., 2009, p8).  
 
The reflection of incoming short-wave radiation can be changed by using different 
technologies such as: i) increasing ocean reflection by producing micro-bubbles, ii) increasing 
land surface reflectivity by crop modification, iii) cloud whitening, and iv) adding sulfur to 
the stratosphere, which we focus on here.  For more details, see Blackstock et al. (2009, p9). 
 
In this paper, we limit the policy of climate engineering to the emission of sulfur into the 
stratosphere.  Emitting sulfur into the stratosphere reflects solar radiation back into space 
before it can contribute to warming the atmosphere.2 Volcanic eruptions have acted as natural 
experiments by emitting large quantities of sulfur into the stratosphere. Mount Pinatubo 
erupted in 1991, leading to a global cooling of about 0.5 °C the following year (Hansen et al., 
1992). The eruption of Tambora in Indonesia in 1815 was the prime contributor to the 
following “year without summer,” in which the temperature from July-August on the Iberian 
Peninsula was 2-3 degrees lower than average for those months (Trigo et al., 2009). 
                                                 
2 For a recent review of climate engineering using stratospheric sulfate aerosol, see Rasch et al. (2008). 
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To cool down a planet, Budyko (1977) proposed using airplanes to burn sulfur during flight in 
the stratosphere to reflect sunlight. According to Rasch et al. (2008, p. 4008), the idea of 
deliberately changing Earth’s climate goes back to the 1830s, when J.P. Espy suggested 
lighting a large fire to change the intensity and frequency of rain. One hundred years later, in 
1955, John von Neumann discussed deliberately changing the radiation balance in order to 
change the climate. According to von Neumann, the investment cost of changing the radiation 
balance is low, but “(t)he  main difficulty lies in predicting in detail the effects of such drastic 
intervention.” However, he was optimistic on behalf of science, as “(o)ur knowledge of the 
dynamics and controlling process of the atmosphere are rapidly approaching a level that 
would permit such predictions” (Neumann 1955,1981, p 41).   
 
Several studies have followed up on Budyko’s suggestions of cooling the planet by emission 
of sulfur into the atmosphere. In the USA, the National Academy of Sciences (1992) analyzed 
climate engineering in their report on policy implications of greenhouse warming. Of major 
concern, were the following three questions: i) Does it appear feasible that engineered 
systems could actually mitigate the effects of greenhouse gases? ii) Is it technically feasible at 
a reasonable cost? iii) Do the proposed systems have effects, besides the sought-after effects, 
that might be adverse, and can these be accepted or dealt with? They answered yes to i) and ii) 
and requested further scrutiny regarding iii).  
 
IPCC’s latest assessment report was less inclined to answer yes to these questions (Barker et 
al., 2007).  Climate engineering tends to be speculative; many of its environmental side 
effects are uncertain, and it is without a clear institutional framework for implementation. In 
Great Britain, the Royal Society made an extensive report on climate engineering, requesting 
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more research with focus on the technological feasibility, cost-effectiveness and 
environmental side effects (Shepherd et al. 2009). 
 
Rasch et al. (2008, p. 4033) conclude in their overview of climate engineering using 
stratospheric sulfate aerosols that this “[…] technique might be used in a planetary emergency 
to mitigate some of the effects of a projected global warming. […] However, many 
uncertainties remain in understanding the influence of climate engineering on the climate 
system […]. More work is required to understand the costs, benefits and risk involved, and to 
reconcile the legal political and ethical issues of climate engineering.” 
 
Crutzen (2006, p 217) concludes his editorial essay about climate engineering with a call for 
active scientific research on the topic. He also stresses that most preferable would be “[…] if 
emissions of the greenhouse gases could be reduced so much that the stratospheric sulphur 
release experiment would not need to take place.” 
 
3 Implementing climate engineering in DICE 
DICE integrates an economic growth model, rooted in the work of Ramsey (1928), with 
climate.  The basic tradeoff is consumption now and consumption in the future.3  Increased 
consumption now reduces investment and precludes some future production possibilities. This 
shrinkage reduces future consumption. Output is determined by a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with labor, capital, and greenhouse gases energy as inputs.  These greenhouse gases 
enter the atmosphere and upper and lower oceans and, over time, affect the radiation balance 
and, therefore, temperature. Increases in temperature again reduce production possibilities 
and, therefore, reduce future consumption.  
                                                 
3 Consumption, measured in dollars in DICE, includes food, cloth, housing, health services, schooling, etc.  
Investment and capital, also measured in dollars, include equipment, education, research, etc.  
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We include climate engineering in the DICE model by modifying the radiation balance 
equations and by adding a cost element. For more details about the DICE model and how we 
modified it, see Appendix A.  Based on studies of the volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 
1991, the effect of the sulfur injection on radiation concentration ranged from 0.75 
TgSWm /2−  (Crutzen, 2006)  to 2.5 TgSWm /2−  (Rasch et al., 2008). We computed an average 
of these: 1.67 TgSWm /2−  = ϖ  in the equation (A 20) in the appendix.  
 
The policy-relevant range of sulfur injection in the atmosphere is 1–5 Tg S, according to 
Crutzen (2006) and references herein. 4  A load of 5 Tg S will outweigh the warming caused 
by a  doubling of current CO2 concentrations. Compared with the overall concentration of 
sulfur in the atmosphere, 1–5 Tg S is small, perhaps 2% (Rasch et al., 2008, p. 4032). Annual 
sulfur emissions due to human activities ranged from 0.8 Tg S in 1850 to a peak of 73 Tg S in 
1987 (Stern 2005).  Current non-volcanically deposition of sulfur in the stratosphere is 0.1 Tg 
S (Rasch et al., 2008, p. 4011), and accordingly, 1-5 Tg S are relative large numbers.  
However, after the eruption Mount Pinatubo in 1991, the concentration of sulfur in the 
tropical stratosphere peaked at 10 Tg S and declined to 6 Tg S within 6 months (Crutzen 
2006).  
 
Cost of climate engineering 
The cost of climate engineering includes the cost of depositing sulfur in the atmosphere, of 
changing the environments, and the economic and social consequences of changing the 
environment. These costs are highly uncertain and this uncertainty is in itself a cost.  
 
                                                 
4 1 Tg S = 1210  grams of sulfur = 1 million tons sulfur. 
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The cost of depositing sulfur in the atmosphere depends on the residency period of the 
deposited sulfur. In the stratosphere, sulfur particles have a residency period of one to two 
years, compared with a couple of weeks in the troposphere. A longer residency period reduces 
the required amount of sulfur significantly. In addition, sulfur injected into the stratosphere 
disperses evenly, and therefore influences radiative forcing over a larger area. The size of the 
sulfur particles, as well as the chemical forms of which they are part, also effect the cost. 
Large particles, such as those from volcanic eruptions, are less effective in scattering 
incoming solar radiation and, in addition, absorb some outgoing energy (Rasch et al., 2008).  
However, the technologies for delivery are immature and cost estimates are, therefore, highly 
uncertain.   
 
The cost of deposition of 1 Tg S is stipulated to be in the range of 225–30,000 million USD 
depending on the technology used (Robock et al. 2009). This range corresponds to 0.0004–
0.045% of the world’s total GDP in 2005, as calibrated in DICE.  Robock et al.  describe 
some deposition technologies: i) Planes burning sulfur through their fuel system or having a 
separate dispersal system, ii) shells filled with sulfur and shot into the stratosphere where they 
burst, iii) balloons filled with sulfur, which explode at the correct altitude, and iv) hoses 
connected to tall towers.  
 
The cost of climate engineering includes environmental impacts and social and economic 
consequences of environmental changes. Environmental damage includes effects such as 
drought in Africa and Asia and ozone depletion. There may also be some positive effects: 
agricultural productivity may increase in some regions, and some regions may experience a 
better climate.  Furthermore, these consequences are uncertain and this uncertainty is a cost in 
itself.  All human decisions are similar; we make decisions every day under conditions of 
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uncertainty. These decisions are made in a trial and error process; decisions are adjusted 
through these processes. However, there are marked differences; the project climate 
engineering is larger and adjustment is harder to achieve.  
 
The technology of sulphur deposition in stratosphere is immature and environmental 
consequences are mostly unknown.  Our research strategy for dealing with these uncertainties 
is to use a broad range of cost functions with a specified upper limit.  This upper limit is 
calibrated so as to render the net benefit of climate engineering negative within the logical 
framework of the DICE model.  With cost functions above this upper level, it is never optimal 
- as calculated in the DICE model - to use climate engineering. 
 
We model the overall cost of climate engineering as a share of worlds GDP, in the same way 
DICE represents the cost of climate change.5  The cost share is: 
 
2
211
1
tt
t GG
D αα ++= , 
 
where tG  is the increased concentration of sulfur in the stratosphere in period t and ( 21,αα ) 
are parameters. This reduces output tQ as follows: 
 
Gross
tt
Net
t QDQ = . 
 
                                                 
5 This cost function is similar to the cost of climate change in DICE; a share of the world’s gross production, 
equations (A4)* and (A6) in the appendix and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000, chapter 4). The cost includes the 
impact on agricultural, health, time use and catastrophic output.  The catastrophic impact is a certainty equivalent 
based on a panel of experts’ best estimates of probabilities of a drop in worlds GDP similar to that of the Great 
Depression for specific temperature increases. In the current version of DICE, the parameterized cost of climate 
change is 1,7 percent of worlds GDP for 2.5 Celsius increase and 9,0 percent for a 6.0 Celsius increase. 
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We use three different parameter sets ( 21,αα ) of the cost function, reported in Table 1. Costs 
of climate engineering are higher the more we engage in it.   
 
 (Insert Table 1 here) 
 
4   Cost-benefit analysis 
The fundamental trade-off in our cost-benefit analysis is current consumption and 
consumption in the future. Increased consumption today reduces investment in man-made 
capital and increases emissions of greenhouse gases. Less investment and higher 
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere come with a cost; production 
possibilities shrink in the future and in that way reduce consumption in the future.   
Investments in climate engineering and emission reduction reduce current consumption, but 
increase consumption in the future and near future, respectively, as production possibilities 
increase.  
 
We present results from three policies: “emission control,” “climate engineering,” and “both 
emission control and climate engineering” compared with “business as usual.”   Adaptations 
to climate change adjust optimally in all policies including business as usual. The net 
economic benefit of a policy is the present value of the differences in consumption in business 
as usual and consumption of the policy, discounted by the business at the usual interest rate. 
For more details, see the appendix.    
 
Our point of departure is that emission reduction is hard to realize and that climate 
engineering is an alternative policy. The net economic benefits of climate engineering range 
from 1.5 to 17.8 trillion US dollars depending on the assumption of cost of climate 
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engineering.  The net benefit is particularly high considering the low cost of climate 
engineering due to the high benefit in terms of reduced climate change damage. The 
temperature increases above the pre-industrial level is below 2 degrees Celsius for lower and 
medium costs of climate engineering (see Figure 1).    
 
Postponement gives us time, through research and field experiments, to learn more about the 
consequences of climate engineering, and we can act in accordance to this information. 
Postponing climate engineering by 30-50 years reduces the total net benefit by less than 10 
percent. Postponing climate engineering to 2050 reduces the net economic benefit by 1,5 
percent using high cost of climate engineering and 6,5  and 9,5  percent  using for medium 
and low cost of climate engineering,  respectively.  
 
 
Combining climate engineering and emission control increases the net benefit even further to 
4.3 – 18.0 trillion US dollars, depending on parameters in the cost of the climate engineering 
function.  As expected, these increases in net benefits are higher due to the higher cost of 
climate engineering. The use of sulphur decreases by adding emission reduction as a policy 
instrument.  If climate engineering costs are low, the increase in the net benefits is relatively 
small and the annual use of sulphur remains almost the same.  For high-cost parameters, the 
net gain increases from 1,5 to 4,3 trillion US dollars, and the use of sulphur decreases to 0,4 
Tg S. Increasing the forcing efficiency, the coefficient ϖ  in equation (A20) in the appendix, 
increases as expected the net benefit of climate engineering; calculations are not shown here. 
 
 
(Table 2 and Figure 1 about here)  
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Cost-benefit analyses of climate engineering pass the cost-benefit test even for - what we 
label here as – the high cost of climate engineering.  If the costs of climate engineering are 
low or medium, the benefit is considerably higher than costs.  These results hinge on our 
assumptions. In DICE, both the economy and climate policies are assumed to work 
efficiently. In the economy, markets allocate labour and capital in an efficient way. 
Abatement policies are implemented efficiently, either as worldwide taxes on greenhouse 
gases or as functioning permit markets for greenhouse gases.  In the next section, we go 
beyond cost-benefit analysis results and discuss implementation of climate engineering.   
 
 
5  Beyond cost-benefit analysis 
In his paper “Incredible economics of geoengineering,” Scott Barrett argues the future 
implementation of climate engineering seems more likely than not,   
“[partly] because the incentives for countries to experiment with geoengineering, 
especially should climate change prove abrupt or catastrophic, are very strong. It is 
also because the incentives for countries to reduce their emissions are weaker.   
Geoengineering and emission reductions are substitutes.” Barrett (2008, pp 45-46)  
 
Even in the face of such strong incentives climate engineering may still be difficult to 
implement. A majority of the electorate may be negative about climate engineering; they do 
not like the idea of tampering with nature, and their dislike stands independent of outcomes of 
cost-benefit analyses.  In these circumstances, politicians will find it difficult to pursue 
climate engineering.  Even if a majority of voters agrees on implementing climate 
engineering, it may still be too costly to implement if a minority of voters strongly disagree. 
This effect can explain why most democracies have super-majority rules for important 
questions (Buchanan and Tullock 1963).  In a similar way, countries may find it difficult to 
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implement climate engineering if other nations strongly oppose. Although there is no formal 
rule that precludes a country from pursuing climate engineering, the political cost of 
implementing it when other countries strongly oppose may be too high.    
 
Voters may oppose climate engineering in the same way as scientists do. Climate engineering 
is controversial in the scientific community.  Thomas Schelling wrote in 1996 that in any 
discussion ten years ago about climate engineering, “part of the audience thought it crazy and 
most of the rest thought it dangerous” (Schelling 1996, p. 303).  Ten years later, scientists 
opposed the publication of Paul Crutzen’s editorial essay (2006) on climate engineering “even 
after peer review and revisions, for various and sincere reasons that are not wholly scientific” 
(Cicerone 2006, p 221). These controversies in the scientific communities mirror, we believe, 
similar controversies among voters. Their beliefs and standpoints influence the possibilities of 
realizing climate engineering.   
 
During a public debate project, participants were skeptical about the deposition of sulfur in 
the stratosphere (NERC 2010). The 87 participants, randomly drawn and between the ages of 
18 and 72, had a debate on climate engineering. The participants were more supportive of 
planting trees than of the deposition of sulfur in the atmosphere; 93 percent “strongly / tend to 
support” aforestation compared to 21 percent for deposition of sulfur particles in the 
stratosphere (NERC 2010, p 24).  Differences in supportiveness between planting trees and 
deposition of sulfur in the stratosphere are explained by what the participants taught natural. 
Planting trees were natural. Deposition of sulfur in stratosphere is not natural; “scientists do 
not have the right to interfere deliberately without knowing the full consequences” (NERC 
2010, p 31).  
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In general, an ethical principle, such as “not tampering with nature,” may be an effective rule 
even though humans cannot understand and rationalize it.  Ethical principles and Rules for 
behaviors reflect collective experiences that “have passed the slow test of time” (North 1993, 
p 5).  Such principles and rules may be efficient, but there is no guarantee that they are. As 
time passes and new challenges arise, such as climate change, ethical principles may change.     
 
Arguments against “not tampering with nature” include those that say humans intentionally 
interfere with nature in many areas; for example in the agricultural sector.  Man cultivates soil 
to make it more fertile, resulting in poisons being deposited into rivers, along with pesticide 
and fertilizer runoff. Man breeds cattle, leading to higher emissions of methane, a powerful 
greenhouse gas. Agricultural and climate engineering, however, differs in time and scale. 
Agriculture develops through an adaptive process involving farmers, buyers and local 
communities over thousands of years. Local environmental consequences internalize in trial-
and-error processes.  Climate engineering is, in this comparison, a large-scale project in which 
humans have less experience. One wrong step may result in dramatically irreversible 
consequences.  These differences between agricultural and climate engineering may explain 
people’s acceptance of agricultural interference in nature while being skeptical towards 
climate engineering.   
 
In a similar way, participants in the NERC’s public debate project stress the difference 
between doing something deliberately and doing it accidentally. The participants meant that it 
is wrong to experiment with depositing sulfur in the stratosphere. On the other hand, burning 
coal and oil, and thus causing increases in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, was a 
necessity not considered as an experiment, NERC (2010, p 55).  
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Another standpoint in the scientific community is that climate engineering may be the first 
step on a slippery slope that leads to global climate management (Virgoe 2009). John von 
Neumann (1955), anticipating that climate management could improve agricultural 
productivity, also warns about the slippery slope:  
 
 “(U)seful and harmful techniques lie everywhere so close together that it is never 
possible to separate lions from the lambs.  This is known to all who have laboriously 
tried to separate secret “classified” science or technology (military) from the open 
kind; success is never more – nor intended to be more – than transient, lasting perhaps 
half a decade. Similarly, a separation into useful and harmful subjects in any 
technological sphere would probably diffuse into nothing in a decade… After global 
climate control becomes possible, perhaps all our present involvements will seem 
simple. We should not deceive ourselves: once such possibilities become actual, they 
will be exploited. It will, therefore, be necessary to develop suitable new political 
forms and procedures.”   
 
 
This slippery slope was also prominent in the public debate project reported in NERC (2010); 
interference with natural systems, such as climate engineering, might legitimize interference 
in nature later (NRCE p. 34).  
 
 
Climate engineering, combined with natural variation in climate over space and time, causes 
regional differences in climate impact over time. Climate engineering may benefit a specific 
region – at least a majority of people in this region may believe it will do so.  In other regions, 
people may believe that consequences of climate engineering are severe. These regional 
differences are open to political challenges both in field experiments and in the eventual 
implementation of climate engineering. Morrow et al. (2009) compare climate engineering 
testing with that of nuclear weapon testing near populated areas and of subjecting poor rural 
African-Americans to medical experiments.  Scholars realizing these potential regional 
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conflicts have called for international governance of climate engineering (Barrett 2008 and 
Lin 2009).   
 
 
6   Conclusion 
Climate engineering passes a standard cost-benefit test given the range of functions for the 
cost of engineering, but the uncertainty remains. The cost of postponing climate engineering 
is relatively low; this provides us time to resolve some of the uncertainties related to climate 
engineering.   
 
Although climate engineering passes standard cost-benefit tests, the political machine has not 
yet approved it. A majority of the electorate may be negative about climate engineering; they 
do not like the idea of tampering with nature, and their dislike stands independent of the 
outcomes of cost-benefit analyses.  In these circumstances, politicians will find it difficult to 
pursue climate engineering, in societies with regular and fair elections as well as in societies 
with authoritarian regimes.   
 
Both emission reduction and climate engineering require international governance.  Elinor 
Ostrom remarks that an important lesson from her intensive study of governance of local 
public goods “is that simply recommending a single government unit to solve global 
collective action problems—because of global impacts—needs to be seriously rethought and 
the important role of smaller-scale effects recognized” (Ostrom, 2009, p. 34).  
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Appendix Equations and Variables —Modified DICE 
 
New and modified equations are marked by asterisks.  
(A1)  ∑
=
=
T
t
tRtLtcuW
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)()](),([  
(A2)  ttR −+= )1()( ρ  
(A3)  )]1/()()[()](),([ 1 αα −= −tctLtLtcu  
(A4)*   γ−γΛ−Ω−−= 1)t(L)t(K)t(A)]t(1)][t(1)][t(D1[)t(Q  
(A5)* ]))t(G)t(G1/[1(1)t(D 221 ϑ+ϑ+−=  
(A6) ]))t(T)t(T1/[1(1)t( 2AT2AT1 ψ+ψ+−=Ω  
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(A8) )t(I)t(C)t(Q +=  
(A9) )(/)()( tLtCtc =  
(A10) )1()1()()( −−+= tKtItK Kδ  
(A11) γγμσ −−= 1)()()()](1)[()( tLtKtAtttEInd  
(A12) ∑
=
≤
T
t
Ind tECCum
0
)(  
(A13) )()()( tEtEtE LandInd +=  
(A14) )1()1()()( 2111 −+−+= tMtMtEtM UPATAT φφ  
(A15) )1()1()1()( 322212 −+−+−= tMtMtMtM LOUPATUP φφφ  
(A19) )1()1()( 3323 −+−= tMtMtM LOUPLO φφ  
(A20)* )()()]}1750(/)([{log)( 2 tGtFMtMtF EXATAT ϖη −+=  
(A21) )]}1()1([)1()({)1()( 321 −−−−−−+−= tTtTtTtFtTtT LOATATATAT ξξξ  
(A22) )]1()1([)1()( 4 −−−+−= tTtTtTtT LOATLOLO ξ  
(A23) 21)()( θϕπ −= tt  
 
 
Variable definitions and units 
New variables are marked by asterisks.  
)(tA   total factor productivity (productivity units) 
)(tc   capita consumption of goods and services (2005 U.S. dollars per person) 
)(tC   consumption of goods and services (trillions of 2005 U.S. dollars) 
)(tELand  emissions of carbon from land use (billions of metric tons of carbon per   
period) 
)(tEInd  industrial carbon emissions (billions of metric tons of carbon per period) 
 
)(tE   total carbon emissions (billions of metric tons of carbon per period) 
)(* tG   increase in level of sulphur in stratosphere due to climate engineering (Tg S) 
)(tF   total radiative forcing (watts per square meter from 1900) 
)(tFEX   exogenous radiative forcing (watts per square meter from 1900) 
)(tI   investment (trillions of 2005 U.S. dollars) 
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)(tK   capital stock (trillions of 2005 U.S. dollars) 
)(tL   population and labour inputs (millions) 
)(tMi     mass of carbon in reservoir for atmosphere (i=AT), upper oceans (i=UP), and
  lower oceans (i=LO) billions of metric tons of carbon, beginning of period 
)(tQ   net output of goods and services, net of abatement and damages (trillions of 
2005 U.S. dollars) 
t   time (decades from 2001–2010, 2011–2020, . . . ) 
)(),( tTtT LOAT  global mean surface temperature and temperature of lower oceans (°C 
  increase from 1900) 
)](),([ tLtcu   utility function (utility per period) 
W   objective function in present value of utility (utility units) 
)(tΛ    abatement costs as fraction of world output) 
)(tμ   emissions-control rate (fraction of uncontrolled emissions) 
)(tΩ   cost of climate change as a fraction of worlds output  
)(* tD   cost of  climate engineering as a fraction of world output 
)(tϕ   participation rate (fraction of emissions included in policy) 
)(tπ   participation cost markup (abatement cost with incomplete participation as 
fraction of abatement cost with complete participation) 
)(tσ    ratio of uncontrolled industrial emissions to output (metric tons of carbon per 
output  in 2005 prices) 
 
Parameters 
New parameters are marked by asterisks.  
α   elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (pure number) 
CCum   maximum consumption of fossil fuels (billions of metric tons of carbon) 
γ   elasticity of output with respect to capita (pure number) 
Kδ   rate of depreciation of capital (per period) 
)(tR   social time preference discount factor (per time period) 
T   length of estimate period for model (60 periods_600 years) 
η   temperature-forcing parameter (°C per watts per meter squared) 
ijφ   parameters of the carbon cycle (flows per period) 
ijψ   parameters of damage function due to temperature increase 
ijϑ*    parameters of damage function due to climate engineering 
ϖ*   efficiency of sulphur in reducing forcing (watts per meter squared per Tg S) 
ρ   pure rate of social time preference (per year) 
21 ),( θθ t  parameters of the abatement-cost function 
ijξ   parameters of climate equations (flows per period) i=AT,UP, and LO and  
j= AT,UP, and LO 
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Cost-benefit calculations  
 
The net economic benefit of a policy is the present value of the difference in consumption in 
business as usual (bau) and the policy discounted by the interest rate of business as usual:   
 
t
T
1t
bau
t
policy
t )CC( β−∑ =  
 
where the discount rates are determined recursively ( ) 10t1tt r1 −− +β≡β  and 11 =β . The real 
interest rate, tr , is derived from the Ramsey-equation ttt gr α+ρ= , where tg  is the growth 
rate of per capita consumption and tρ  is determined by solving 10t )1()1( ρ+=ρ+ .   
 
The net economic benefit is split into benefit, cost of climate engineering and abatement cost. 
By using equations (A4)* and (A8) and by defining ( ) ( ) γγ −= 1jtjtjtjt LKAY  for j=bau and 
policy, the difference in the consumption pattern of policy and business as usual is  
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The first line on the right-hand-side of the approximation sign is the benefit including 
reduction in damage of climate change; the second line, the cost of climate engineering; and 
the last line is the abatement cost. The approximation is linear in the parameters ),D,( ttt ΩΛ . 
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Tables 
 
Table 1   Cost of climate engineering as percentage of total world production.  
 
 
Climate engineering  ( Tg S)  Cost of climate 
engineering (%) 1 5  
Low 0,1  1  
Medium 0,5  5  
High 1  10  
Upper limit  2,4 40.0 
Note: Upper limit is calculated from the “climate engineering” policy.  
 
Table 2 Present value of net benefits and costs for policies “climate engineering,” “climate 
engineering and emission control,” and “emission control only” compared to business as 
usual.  All measured in trillion USD (2005).   
 
   
 
Net 
economic 
benefits 
Benefits  Costs of climate engineering 
Abatement 
costs 
Policy  
Annual 
use of 
sulfur  
 (Tg S) 
Climate 
engineering  
      Low 
      Medium  
      High 
 
 
17,8 
5,9 
1,5 
 
22,4 
13,7 
5,5 
 
4,9 
8,0 
4,0 
na 
 
 
2,7 
1,4 
0,7 
 
      
Climate 
engineering and 
emission control  
       Low 
       Medium 
       High  
18,0 
7,4 
4,3 
22,5 
14,7 
8,3 
4,7 
6,5 
2,3 
0,1 
1,0 
1,8 
2,5 
1,2 
0,4 
      
Emission control 
only 3,7 5,9 na 2,3 na 
 
Notes: i) Low, medium, and high refer to cost of climate engineering.  ii) Last column is mean 
annual use of sulfur for the first 200 years.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1   Temperature increases from pre-industrial time for “business as usual” and “climate 
engineering only.” Lower and upper borders of shadow areas are low and high costs, 
respectively, of climate engineering.  
 
 
 
 
 
